Abstract. Plateau characteristics are a special type of characteristics whose probability depends on the key and can have only 2 values. For a (usually small) subset of the keys it has a non-zero probability and for all other keys its probability is zero. In this paper we prove that for a large group of ciphers, including the AES, all two-round characteristics are plateau characteristics. For the AES and other ciphers with a similar structure we show that the vast majority of characteristics over 4 or more rounds are plateau characteristics. In the case of the AES, for most keys there are two-round characteristics with fixed-key probability equal to 32/2 32 while the Maximum Expected Differential Probability (MEDP) of two-round differentials is at most 13.25/2 32 .
Our results don't affect the MEDP of characteristics, but show that the distribution of the key-dependent probability is not narrow and hence the widely made assumption that it can be approximated by the EDP, is not justified.
Applying our results to the AES, we see that for almost all values of the key there are two-round characteristics with a fixed-key probability equal to 32/2 32 , while the MEDP of two-round characteristics is at most 4/2 32 [12] and the MEDP of two-round differentials [17] is at most 13.25/2 32 [14, 23, 24] .
After introducing some basic definitions in Section 2 and presenting our motivation for this work in Section 3, Section 4 introduces plateau characteristics over two rounds. Characteristics over more than two rounds are studied in Section 5. We present some further observations in Section 6. We analyze the key-dependent probability of all two-round characteristics over the AES in Section 7. We discuss more-round characteristics over the AES in Section 8 and the impact on differentials in Section 9. We conclude in Section 10.
Definitions
We denote a differential [17] over a map by (a, b) and assume that it is clear from the context which map we mean. We call a the input difference and b the output difference. The probability of a differential is denoted by DP(a, b). For a keyed map, we can define a differential probability DP[k](a, b) for each value k of the key. We define the expected differential probability (EDP) of a differential as the average of the differential probability DP(a, b) over all keys.
A composed function consists of a sequence of maps, called steps. A characteristic through a composed function is a sequence of differences a, b, . . . . The sequence consists of an input difference a, followed by the output differences of all the steps of the composed function. A characteristic over a keyed composed map has a differential probability DP[k](Q) for each value k of the key. The EDP of a characteristic is the average of its DP[k] over all keys. In this paper, we only consider characteristics with EDP > 0. Definition 1 ([12] ). The weight of a differential or a characteristic is minus the binary logarithm of their EDP.
weight(a, b) = − log 2 EDP(a, b), weight(Q) = − log 2 EDP(Q) .
Motivation
An important example of composed maps is formed by block ciphers. Modern block ciphers are designed to resist differential cryptanalysis. Often they come with provable bounds on EDP values of either characteristics [12] or differentials [22, 20] . For older ciphers like the DES, the EDP of a differential can be estimated by the EDP of one characteristic, the dominating characteristic [6] . For many modern block ciphers, there are no dominating characteristics, and this estimate can no longer be used. It is also tempting to invoke the Hypothesis 1 (Hypothesis of Stochastic Equivalence [17] ) For all differentials (a, b), it holds that for most values of the key k,
The main use of the Hypothesis of Stochastic Equivalence is that it allows one to construct proofs of security. The proofs give bounds on the expected data complexity of differential attacks where the attacker uses exactly one differential. The hypothesis has been observed to hold in toy ciphers [16] , but not in ciphers that are used in practice, for instance DES [7, 15] and IDEA [9] . In any case, the hypothesis can't be applied to the probability of characteristics.
While DP[k] of a characteristic is always a multiple of 2 1−n b , with n b the input size of the map, the EDP of a characteristic can take much smaller values.
When we examine the resistance of the AES and related ciphers against differential cryptanalysis, the Hypothesis of Stochastic Equivalence is of little use. For instance, for characteristics over 4 or more rounds, the EDP values are already below 2 −150 2 1−n b = 2 −127 . In this paper we describe completely the distribution of DP of all characteristics over two rounds of the AES. We also give results for four and more rounds. Our analysis is not based on any hypothesis. The following example illustrates in a simple way the effects we want to examine for the AES.
where ρ is an arbitrary invertible transformation [13] . Let M EDP (ρ) denote the maximum EDP(a, b) of a differential over ρ, where only nonzero values for a are considered. Then M EDP (ρ) is an upper bound for the EDP of a differential over E. Since E[0] is the identity transformation, for all differences a the differential (a, a) over the map E has fixed-key probability DP[0](a, a) = 1. This property holds whatever value M EDP (ρ) takes.
This example is contrived. In practice we don't expect DP[k] to deviate this strongly from EDP. However, we observe effects that go in this direction. We found that for several ciphers, including the AES, DP[k] has a distribution with a surprisingly rich structure.
Two-round plateau characteristics
In this section we show that for a large class of ciphers, two-round characteristics have a DP[k] that can take only two values.
Planar differentials and maps
As customary, we consider ordered pairs of inputs [6] , but we denote them using curled braces '{}' in order to avoid confusion with differentials. Let F (a,b) denote the set containing the inputs x for which the pair {x, x + a} is a right pair for the differential (a, b) over an unkeyed map. Let G (a,b) denote the set containing the corresponding outputs. Similarly, let
denote the set containing the inputs x for which the pair {x, x + a} is a right pair for the characteristic Q over a keyed map. Let G Q [k] denote the set containing the corresponding outputs. We introduce the concept of planar differentials:
and G (a,b) form affine subspaces [1] :
with U (a,b) and V (a,b) vector spaces, u any element in F (a,b) and v any element in G (a,b) .
Similarly, we have b ∈ V (a,b) and dim(V (a,b) ) = n b − weight(a, b). We can now prove the following lemmas.
Lemma 1.
A differential (a, b) which has exactly two right pairs, is planar.
Proof. Denote the pairs by {p, p ⊕ a}, {p ⊕ a, p}. The elements p and p ⊕ a form an affine subspace of dimension 1 with offset u = p and the basis of U (a,b) equal to (a). A similar argument is valid for the elements of the pairs at the output.
Lemma 2.
A differential (a, b) which has exactly four right pairs, is planar.
Proof. Denote the inputs of the pairs by p, p ⊕ a, q and q ⊕ a. These 4 elements lie in an affine subspace of dimension 2 with offset u = p and basis of U (a,b) equal to (a, p ⊕ q). A similar argument is valid for the elements of the pairs at the output.
Lemma 3. Any differential with DP = 1 is a planar differential.
Proof. F (a,b) and G (a,b) form the complete input space and output space respectively.
Examples of differentials with DP = 1 are the trivial differential (0, 0) and differentials over linear maps. If DP(a, b) = 2 t−n b , with t ∈ {1, 2, n b }, the differential may or may not be planar.
Definition 3.
A map is planar if all differentials over it are planar.
Any map for which all non-trivial differentials have DP(a, b) ≤ 2 2−n b is planar. Such maps are called differentially 4-uniform [21] . Now we give two lemmas on planar differentials over composed maps. The first lemma applies for instance to a substitution step in a block cipher, consisting of the parallel application of some S-boxes.
Lemma 4. Let y = α(x) be a map consisting of a set of parallel maps y i = α i (x i ) with x = (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x t ) and y = (y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y t ). A differential (a, b) for which the differentials
We have
with × denoting the direct product [1] . The following lemma applies to a sequence of maps. with
Examples of ciphers in which single-round differentials are planar are the AES, but also 3-Way [8] , SHARK [25] , Square [10] , Camellia [4] , Serpent [2] and Noekeon [11] . Some other popular maps that are planar, are the majority function f (x, y, z) = xy ⊕ xz ⊕ yz and the 'if' function g(x, y, z) = xy ⊕ (¬x)z or any map that is quadratic in GF(2).
Plateau characteristics
Similar to the concept of plateaued functions [28] , for which the Walsh spectrum takes only two values (in absolute value), we introduce here plateau characteristics as characteristics for The height of a plateau characteristic can be bounded as follows. Firstly, height(Q) ≤ n b .
Secondly, height(Q) is maximal when all but one key have DP equal to zero. Denoting the number of keys by 2 n k , we obtain that in this case EDP equals 2 −n k times the non-zero DP value. Taking the logarithm, we obtain −weight(Q) = −n k + height(Q) − n b . Hence, we have in all cases height(Q) ≤ n k + n b − weight(Q). We can now prove the following result on an n b -bit map consisting of two steps and an addition with an n b -bit key in between (hence n k = n b ). 
Since both differentials are planar, there exist offsets u, v such that
with V (a,b) and U (b,c) vector spaces. We start by deriving the condition that H is non-empty.
First we translate the affine subspaces in the equation by the vector v:
v ⊕ H is a translated version of H and has the same number of elements. Now v ⊕ H is non-empty iff there is a vector x ∈ V (a,b) and a vector y ∈ U (b,c) such that
This is equivalent to saying that (k⊕u⊕v)
by K Q , this corresponds to saying that H is non-empty iff k ∈ K Q . Consider now the case that H is non-empty and let w be an element of H. Clearly, w is an element of both
Translation by w yields:
The number of elements in K Q is determined by the dimension of V (a,b) ⊕ U (b,c) . We use the
keys on the total number of 2 n b keys, and zero for all other keys.
This theorem is valid for all ciphers in which single-round differentials are planar and round keys are applied with XOR. This includes all ciphers mentioned in Section 4.1.
Like any other characteristic, a plateau characteristic has EDP(Q) = DP(a, b)DP(b, c) =
keys. This can only be the case for characteristics with weight(Q) < n b .
Plateau characteristics in super boxes
Several ciphers that use S-boxes and linear transformations can also be described using the structure of a super box.
Definition 5. A super box maps an array a of n t elements a i to an array e of n t elements e i . Each of the elements has size n s . A super box takes a key k of size n t × n s = n b . It consists of the sequence of four transformations (or steps):
n t parallel applications of a n s -bit S-box -c = M(b): a linear map with branch number n t + 1 [10] -d = c ⊕ k: key addition
n t parallel applications of a n s -bit S-box
The S-boxes in the two S-box steps may also be all different. A characteristic over the super box can specify that one or more of the S-boxes have input difference 0. Such S-boxes have always output difference 0, with probability 1. When computing the probability of a characteristic, only the S-boxes with non-zero input difference need to be taken into account. They are called active S-boxes.
We can prove the following upper bound on height(Q) for plateau characteristics in super boxes.
Theorem 2. Let Q be a plateau characteristic over a super box. Let the sets γ j denote all possible selections of n t S-boxes from the super box. Then
where (x i , y i ) denotes a differential over an S-box. ,b) ). Taking for γ 1 the selection of the n t S-boxes of the first step, we have from Definition 2:
Secondly, observe that the vectors (b, d) = (b, M(b)) are code vectors of a linear code over GF(2 ns ) with length 2n t and dimension n t . Since the branch number of M equals n t + 1, the minimal distance between code vectors is n t + 1, hence the code is MDS. Any n t symbols of the codewords may be taken as message symbols [19] . Hence, we can always pick n t out of the symbols, consider them as the message symbols (input) and compute the check symbols Hence, given a characteristic over a super box, one chooses the n t S-box differentials with the highest weight and adds them. The bound for the height is n b minus this weight. 
Plateau characteristics over more than 2 rounds
In this section we derive conditions for characteristics over more than 2 rounds to be plateau characteristics. For ciphers with an AES-like block structure (the AES, Square, SHARK, . . . ), the results of this section cover the majority of the characteristics. For ciphers without the block structure (3-Way, Serpent, Noekeon, . . . ), only a small fraction of the characteristics is covered.
We can extend the planar property of differentials to characteristics:
Definition 6. A characteristic Q is input-planar (respectively output-planar) if for all values of the key it holds that
is either ∅ or an affine subspace.
Lemma 6. Plateau characteristics with height 1 or 2 are both input-planar and output-planar.
Proof. Let Q be a plateau characteristic. Then
. If height(Q) is 1 or 2, then the proofs of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 can be extended to the case of characteristics. Fig. 1 . Notation used in the proof of Theorem 4.
For a cipher with S-boxes that are differentially 4-uniform or differentially 2-uniform we have the following result.
Theorem 4 (Planar Characteristic Extension Theorem).
Let Q = (Q 1 , q n ) be a characteristic composed of an output-planar characteristic Q 1 = (q 0 , . . . , q n−1 ), followed by a (onestep) differential (q n−1 , q n ). If all S-boxes in (q n−1 , q n ) are active, then Q is output-planar.
Proof. In this proof, we drop [k] from the notation, which we illustrate in Figure 1 . If we look at the output of Q 1 , the elements of the right pairs of Q 1 , form the affine subspace V Q 1 .
Since the differential (q n−1 , q n ) is planar, the elements of the right pairs of Q form an affine subspace H = V Q 1 ∩ U (q n−1 ,qn) . We denote by H i , 0 ≤ i < n t , the projection of H onto the coordinate i: H i contains the inputs of one S-box in the last step, for the right pairs of Q.
Since H i is a projection of an affine subspace, it is also an affine subspace. We denote by O i the corresponding outputs of the S-box. The set O i is nothing else than the projection of the set G Q on the coordinate i.
Since the S-boxes are differentially 4-uniform (or 2-uniform), H i and O i contain 1, 2, or 4 elements and O i is also an affine subspace. Using Lemma 4, we conclude that G Q is also an affine subspace.
Note that this theorem also holds for a characteristic composed of a planar differential in which all S-boxes are active followed by an input-planar characteristic. Planar plateau characteristics can be composed to plateau characteristics. Theorem 1 can easily be extended.
Theorem 5 (Planar Characteristic Composition Theorem).
Let Q = (q 0 , q 1 , . . . , q i−1 , q i , . . . , q n ) be a characteristic over a map consisting of n steps with a key addition as i-th step. If the characteristics Q 1 = (q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q i−1 ) and Q 2 = (q i , . . . , q n ) are plateau characteristics with Q 1 output-planar and Q 2 input-planar, then Q is a plateau
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. From this theorem follows this corollary:
followed by a (one-round) planar differential (q n−1 , q n ). If Q 1 is a plateau characteristic with height 1 or 2, then Q is a plateau characteristic.
This is a special case of Theorem 1: according to Lemma 6, Q 1 is output-planar and the differential can be seen as a (one-round) input-planar plateau characteristic.
This extension of a plateau characteristic by a single round can be performed iteratively:
an r-round plateau characteristic with height 1 or 2 can be extended by an arbitrary number of rounds, as long as the appended differentials are planar.
Plateau characteristics with height larger than 2, are in general neither input-planar nor output-planar. For instance, assume that we have a plateau characteristic Q consisting of an output-planar characteristic Q 1 followed by an input-planar characteristic Q 2 with Q = (Q 1 , Q 2 ). Then it follows from the proof of Theorem 1 that the elements of the right pairs of Q form an affine subspace H at the junction of Q 1 and Q 2 . The set H is transformed to the
in general is not an affine subspace.
Further observations

Effect of the key schedule
When we consider more than two rounds, the round keys are typically not independent. 
Impact on the DP of differentials
The dependence of the DP of characteristics on the key value means that the DP of differentials also depends on the key. Assume we have a differential for which all characteristics are plateau characteristics. If we denote the characteristics that contribute to a differential (a, b) by Q i
we have:
Hence this value varies per key k depending on the number of affine subspaces K Q i it is in.
Two-round characteristics in the AES
We now apply the results of the previous sections to the AES. We also compute the heights of all two-round characteristics for the AES and for a simplified variant. Since the sequence of two rounds of Square is equivalent to the sequence of two rounds of the AES, the distribution of the heights of characteristics is the same in both cases.
The AES Super box
The AES S-box operates on GF(2 8 ) and can be described as
Here x −1 denotes the multiplicative inverse of x in GF(2 8 ), extended with 0 being mapped to 0. L is a linear transformation over GF (2) and q a constant. Note that L is not linear over GF (2 8 ) and can be expressed as a so-called linearized polynomial [18] .
The AES super box is a super box where the elements are bytes and n t = 4 and M is the multiplication with the MixColumns matrix, which we denote by M c . If we consider two AES rounds, swap the steps ShiftRows and SubBytes in the first round, and remove all linear operations before the first application of SubBytes and after the second application of SubBytes, then we obtain a map that can also be described as 4 parallel instances of the AES super box.
A differential characteristic through the AES super box consists of a sequence of 5 differences: a, b, c, d and e. In a characteristic through the AES super box, we always have c = d
(so we omit c) and d = M c b. We denote these characteristics by (a, b, d, e).
Characteristics in the AES super box
The AES super box satisfies the criteria of Theorem 1 and hence all characteristics Q in the AES super box are plateau characteristics. DP[k](Q) can be described by defining W =
Applying We have determined the weight and height of all characteristics over the AES super box.
An overview of the results is given in Table 1 
. From Lemma 7 and Lemma 8, we have that
Consequently, it is only needed to check the height of each characteristic with (a, e) chosen such that all active S-boxes have weight 6, and then to evaluate the effect of increasing the weight of the active S-boxes by one. For this last step, only one out of the 126 possible differences a i , respectively e i , needs to be tried for each active S-box.
Observations
We see in Table 1 that the characteristic weight ranges from 30 to 56 and the height from 1 to 5. It follows from the data in the table that the ratio
ranges from 1 to 2 25 . We call characteristics for which the ratio is 1 flat characteristics because for these the equality DP[k](Q) = EDP(Q) holds for all keys. Table 1 The table shows also that it is easy to find characteristics Q 1 , Q 2 with EDP(Q 1 ) < EDP(Q 2 ) and height(Q 1 ) > height(Q 2 ).
An AES variant
If we remove the linear transformation L and the constant q from the S-box (4), we obtain a cipher with a simpler algebraic structure than the AES. We call this variant the naive AES.
We computed the heights of all characteristics over the naive AES super box. The results are summarized in Table 2 . The comparison with the results in Table 1 Although the results on characteristics do not necessarily translate to results on differentials, it appears that L has an impact on the differential properties of two and more rounds of the AES. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of the impact of L.
Characteristics over four or more rounds in the AES
Four-round AES can be described with a super box-like structure, where again n t = 4 but now the elements are 32-bit words [26, 27] . The AES super boxes we defined before serve now as (key-dependent) S-boxes. The super box-like structure is constructed as follows. This implies that most of the four-round characteristics over the AES are plateau characteristics. We have not determined the distribution of the heights, but Theorem 2 and a straightforward generalization of Theorem 3 apply. Since the overwhelming majority of the characteristics over the AES super box have height 1, we expect that also the vast majority of the characteristics over 4 rounds of the AES will have height 1. Corollary 1 would then imply that the vast majority of characteristics over more than 4 AES rounds are plateau characteristics with height 1.
DP of differentials in the AES
The exact distribution of DP[k](a, b) depends on the relative positions of the affine subspaces K Q i and the height of the characteristics. Flat characteristics add a constant term and do not contribute to the variability. The larger the height of a characteristic, the more it contributes to the variability. In the AES super box there is at most one flat characteristic per differential with 5 active S-boxes and none for differentials with more than 5 active S-boxes.
The AES has no flat plateau characteristics over 4 rounds or more, and the vast majority of characteristics has height equal to 1. In the assumption that the affine subspaces K Q i are independent, the distribution of the DP[k] of any four-round differential is the convolution of a huge number of distributions with a high peak in 0 and a very small peak in 2 −127 . We conjecture that this gives rise to a Poisson distribution.
Conclusions and further work
We believe that an analysis of resistance against differential cryptanalysis needs to take into account more than the average behavior of a key-dependent map.
In this paper, we showed that the DP[k] of certain characteristics is distributed in a very structured way. For characteristics over the AES super box, we showed that DP[k] ∈ 0, 2 h−32 , with h an integer value between 1 and 5. We think that the results are somewhat surprising and deserve to be investigated in further detail. We have illustrated our analysis only on the AES, but several other ciphers using differentially 4-uniform S-boxes will show a similar behavior.
It would be interesting to find out what the maximum DP[k] is for characteristics over more than 2 rounds. If the impact on the DP[k] of differentials over more than 2 rounds can be investigated, then this could lead to new insights about the security margin of the AES and other ciphers.
